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Postcard from the ICTY 
Sophie Rigney 
The postcard juxtaposes two images of handcuffs, set against a black background. The first set of 
handcuffs, positioned at the top of the postcard, are made from cloth. They appear ragged, dirty 
with soil, and tightly bound. A sentence below the image describes them as “Exhibit No. P16/6 … 
(Srebrenica)”, and on the back of the postcard, a further explanation is provided: “Cloth handcuffs 
used to bind victims wrists, found on a body in a mass grave near Srebrenica”. The second pair of 
handcuffs are made from steel. They are lockable, and closed. The description given is that they 
are “UN-ICTY handcuffs”. Separating the two images are the words – in English and either French 
or Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian – ‘Bringing war criminals to justice and justice to victims’. On the 
back of the postcard, the logos and names of both the United Nations and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’ or ‘the Tribunal’) sit in the centre-top of the card. 
There is plenty of room for writing a message to tell your loved one of your visit to the ICTY, and 
space to address the card and affix a stamp. The postcard is available at the ICTY, for no cost. A 
larger version of this postcard also appears as a banner, situated in the reception area of the ICTY 
and just adjacent to the doors which separate the public space from the space that only employees 
can access. The ICTY employees must walk past this image on their way into their workspace, 
every day. The image depicted on the postcard and banner is the key object employed by the ICTY 
to articulate its work, for both internal and external audiences.   
The aesthetic of the postcard is striking, with the clear images and words rising out of the dark. It 
is clear that this postcard is designed to send a message about the work of the ICTY. The aim of 
the Tribunal is articulated as having two aspects: to bring war criminals to justice, and justice to 
victims. These two aspects are offered as interlinked – without justice being imposed upon war 
criminals, justice cannot be provided to victims. In both these respects, the ICTY is presented as 
instrumental. It is the ICTY who inflicts justice on war criminals, and it is the ICTY who gives 
justice to victims.  
As an object the postcard (and the objects it depicts – the two sets of handcuffs) reveals a great 
deal about the aims of international criminal law, and the concomitant image of international 
criminal law. In this chapter, I examine the postcard as an object that indicates particular aims of 
‘Postcard from the ICTY: Examining International Criminal Law's Narratives’, International Law's Objects: Emergence, 
Encounter and Erasure Through Object and Image (2017), reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
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international criminal law, and I argue that the postcard demonstrates international criminal law’s 
preoccupation with two objectives: ending impunity, and providing a meaningful voice for victims. 
I also examine the postcard as an object that is used in the branding and marketing of international 
criminal law.1 In particular, I examine the claims to end impunity and to provide a place for victims 
as statements to market the ICTY and international criminal law more generally. But why does an 
object designed to ‘market’ an international criminal tribunal use language and imagery that 
suggests guilt? What is the effect of this? And what does the placement of the victim’s handcuffs 
and the accused’s handcuffs tell us about the place of the victim and the accused in these trials? I 
argue that, in these ways, the postcard is problematic. As a marketing technique, this postcard 
succeeds in promoting particular aspects of international criminal law – but in doing so, it also 
manipulates (and reinforces) unhelpful tropes of good versus evil, of ‘deserving’ victimhood, and 
of conviction as a core component of international criminal law. The postcard and the handcuffs 
provide a place to critically analyse the system of international criminal law, and the stories it tells 
about its aspirations and operations. 
THE AIMS AND MARKETING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Examining the aims of international criminal law provides us with a rubric to understand this 
system of law and its institutions and processes. Through analysing international criminal law’s 
aims, we can identify what international criminal law aspires to, what it values, and what underpins 
its operations. We also then have a mechanism for assessment: aims allow us to measure the 
achievements of international criminal law against its own criteria, and permit a space for critique. 
The aims of international criminal law are legion. These include ending impunity, the restoration 
or maintenance of peace, reconciliation, giving victims a meaningful voice, deterrence, a socio-
pedagogic or didactic function, ensuring an accurate historical record, and setting out the ‘truth’ 
of events.2 Of these objectives, ‘ending impunity’ and ‘giving victims a meaningful voice’ are 
                                                          
1 See Christine Schwöbel, ‘The Market and Marketing Culture of International Criminal Law’ in Christine Schwöbel 
(ed), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law (Routledge, 2014) 264. My thanks to Jessie Hohmann and 
Dan Joyce for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter; and to the participants of the Objects 
workshop, whose collegial and insightful thoughts assisted my development of this chapter.   
2 See, for example, Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 1; John Jackson, ‘Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals: Beyond 
the Inquisitorial–Adversarial Dichotomy’ (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 17; Mirjan Damaška, 
‘The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for International Criminal Tribunals’ (2001) 36 North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 365; Mark Klamberg, ‘What are the Objectives 
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often invoked as being the core rationales for the system of international criminal law. They also 
position international criminal law quite apart from domestic law.3 In this way, the emphasis of 
the postcard on ‘bringing war criminals to justice and justice to victims’ is unsurprising, and is 
indicative of the importance international criminal law and its institutions (such as the ICTY) 
places on ending impunity and providing a voice to victims. 
The aims of international criminal law also provide a narrative for international criminal law – and 
thus, an instrument to tell the community why international criminal law is valuable, and should 
be supported. There is a clear overlap here between the aims of international criminal law, and the 
ability to ‘market’ international criminal law. Christine Schwöbel has explored international 
criminal law’s commitment to branding, or what she calls the marketing culture of international 
criminal law.4 The ICTY postcard is, I argue, an example of the branding and marketing of 
international criminal law. It is a tool designed to promote the product or service of international 
criminal law. As Schwöbel points out, ‘branding involves the creation of a unique name and image 
for a particular product. This is about the attributes of a product, the promise’.5 Marketing is 
defined as ‘the selling of the product’, and is interdependent with the branding of the product.6 
Marketing is perceived to be important for international criminal law, because international 
criminal law is a system dependent on the support of states (for finances, for the execution of 
warrants, and for access to materials for investigations). States therefore require a reason to support 
the system and its institutions: narratives about the aims of international law provide these reasons, 
and are communicated through branding and marketing methods – such as this postcard.  
BRINGING WAR CRIMINALS TO JUSTICE … 
                                                          
of International Criminal Procedure? — Reflections on the Fragmentation of a Legal Regime’ (2010) 79 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 279; Carsten Stahn, ‘Between “Faith” and “Facts”: By What Standards Should We 
Assess International Criminal Justice?’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 251; Mirjan Damaška, 
‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 611; 
Bert Swart, ‘Damaška and the Faces of International Criminal Justice’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 87; Minna Schrag, ‘Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience: Notes for the ICC Prosecutor’ (2004) 2 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 427, 428. 
3 Bert Swart, ‘International Criminal Justice and Models of Traditional Process’ in Göran Sluiter and Sergey 
Vasiliev (eds), International Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law (Cameron May, 2009) 93, 105. 
For more on how the aims of international criminal law as a legal system differ from the aims of international 
criminal trials and the institutions of international criminal law, see Sophie Rigney, ‘Fairness, the Rights of the 
Accused, and Procedure in International Criminal Trials’ (doctoral thesis), 2015. 
4 Schwöbel, (n 1), 264. 
5 Ibid, 270. 
6 Ibid. 
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The aim of ending impunity galvanises international criminal justice. The ICTY was established 
because the United Nations Security Council was ‘determined to put an end to such crimes and to 
take effective measures to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for them’.7 Elsewhere, 
the Rome Statute specifically mentions ending impunity as the raison d’être of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).8 Impunity can be understood as ‘the impossibility … of bringing the 
perpetrators of violence to account … since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to 
their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to 
making reparations to their victims’.9 Thus, ending impunity requires an individualised criminal 
process against a particular person, involving prosecution, and probably conviction. Any failure to 
prosecute — either passive (for example, neglecting to investigate), or active (such as the use of 
amnesties)10 — signals impunity; and in turn, this suggests the inability of law to account for mass 
atrocities, official toleration of violence, and a sense that perpetrators are protected (and even 
enabled) in their commission of crimes. At a broad level, the call to end impunity therefore 
emphasises the system of criminal law as a response to atrocity. At a more individualised level, 
ending impunity will emphasise prosecutions against particular people.11 Karen Engle has tracked 
the recent rise in the rhetoric of ending impunity, and argues that human rights advocacy has 
moved ‘from naming, shaming, and sometimes judicially trying states for their violations of human 
rights to finding ways to hold individuals criminally responsible for them’.12 However, this focus 
on individualised trial can be criticised as permitting a decontexutalisation of the events 
surrounding the crimes, which can allow the underlying structural causes of the atrocities to be 
                                                          
7 SC Res 827, UN SCOR, 48th sess, 3217th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993), as amended by SC Res 1877, 
UN SCOR, 64th sess, 6155th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1877 (7 July 2009) (‘ICTY Statute’) preamble. 
8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (entered into 
force 1 July 2002) (‘Rome Statute’) preamble. 
9 United Nations Economic and Social Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update 
the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (8 February 2005). 
10 Karen Engle, ‘Anti-Impunity and the Turn to Criminal Law in Human Rights Law and Advocacy’ (2015) 100 
Cornell Law Review 1070, 1077. 
11 This is particularly apparent with the system of complementarity at the International Criminal Court. It is not clear 
whether processes like a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which allowed amnesties would permit a case to be 
admissible at the ICC. See Diba Mazjub, ‘Peace or Justice?: Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law  247. 
12 Engle, (n 10), 1071. 
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ignored.13 The emphasis on trials may be seen as another symptom of international law’s obsession 
with crises, rather than with engaging in a systematic examination of the causes of conflict.14 
While ending impunity requires both a system of international criminal law and particular 
prosecutions, it also suggests the importance of a finding of guilt at the end of the trial. As impunity 
connotes ‘the exemption from punishment’,15 and punishment only comes after a finding of guilt, 
ending impunity is tied to conviction. Indeed, international criminal law is a system that ‘thrives 
on conviction’.16 As such, conviction becomes integral to the aims of international criminal law. 
Mirjan Damaška has argued that because ending impunity is so central to international criminal 
law, ‘high acquittal rates could easily augur failure of [the courts’] mission’.17 He advocates an 
‘abandonment, or relaxation, of some cherished domestic procedural arrangements’, because 
‘international criminal courts cannot successfully pursue their manifold objectives by strictly 
abiding by most demanding domestic rules of procedure’.18 Thus, relaxing or even abandoning 
procedural mechanisms can be undertaken to end impunity. 
In this case, the postcard is resolute in its suggestion of culpability. War criminals will be brought 
to justice. There is no permitted possibility that the accused is not guilty. There is no room for the 
nuance of the presumption of innocence. There is no acknowledgement of the possibility of 
acquittal. Not only do the words reinforce the guilt of the ‘war criminal’, but these words are paired 
with an image of handcuffs – which are such a powerful object of guilt that they are often not 
allowed in a courtroom, so as to maintain the image of the accused’s presumed innocence.19  
Here we start to see the complex (and troubling) interactions between guilt, the aims of 
international criminal law, and the marketing of international criminal law. In this postcard, guilt 
                                                          
13 Koskenniemi, (n Error! Bookmark not defined.2); Tor Krever, ‘International Criminal Law: An Ideology 
Critique’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 701; Engle, above n 10, 1119; Immi Tallgren, ‘Sensibility 
and Sense of International Criminal Law’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 561, 594.  
14 See Hilary Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline of Crisis’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 377. 
15 Amnesty International, ‘Policy Statement on Impunity’ in Neil J Kritz (ed), Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995) 219, cited in Engle, (n 10), 
1077. 
16 William A Schabas, ‘Balancing the Rights of the Accused with the Imperatives of Accountability’ in Ramesh 
Thakur and Peter Malcontent (eds), From Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for 
Justice in a World of States (United Nations University Press, 2004) 154, 165. 
17 Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’, (n Error! Bookmark not defined.2), 613. 
18 Ibid 612.  
19 See Robert G. Neds, ‘Criminal Defendants: Maintaining the Appearance of Innocence’ (1972) Missouri Law 
Review 660. 
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is inferred as a way of both setting out the aims of the ICTY, and of marketing the institution (and 
the system of law). More than just an aim of international criminal law, the promise of ending 
impunity has become part of the branding and marketing of international criminal law.20 This 
marketing is perhaps even more acute in the case of the ICC, which relies on states to provide 
direct funding (unlike the ICTY, which has been funded by the United Nations Security Council). 
As Sara Kendall points out, in order to receive political and financial support from States Parties, 
the ICC has had to ‘cast itself as more ambitious than it can be: hence its overdetermined claims 
to ‘ending impunity’’.21  
As a marketing technique, the call to end impunity is particularly clever because it both names the 
problem (impunity) and the only possible solution – international criminal law. Impunity becomes 
not only something to rally against, but also something to bolster the position of international 
criminal law, because impunity is the problem to which only international criminal law is the 
solution. Connected to this, Schwöbel argues that the anti-impunity rhetoric ‘may be a screen’ to 
shield ‘the purpose of growth and ultimately empire-building’: in her view,  
advocates of international criminal law appear to be artificially creating gaps, declaring the 
given norms, institutions, and experts inadequate to address injustices. They then present 
the world with the necessary solution, i.e. the norms, institutions, and experts of 
international criminal law.22  
Indeed, in contemporary times it is almost impossible to consider that anyone would advocate in 
favour of impunity. As such, the call to ‘anti-impunity often “concoct[s] the anxiety it lives 
from”’.23 Thus we can see that the aim to end impunity becomes a marketing tool associated with 
the maintenance of a system, in spite of the fact that impunity itself no longer has the power or 
influence it perhaps once had. The postcard is an example of this: it declares that war criminals 
must be brought to justice, and few today would disagree. Yet in stating this, the postcard is also 
intimating that there is a problem with ‘impunity’, to which the ICTY is the ‘necessary solution’.  
In this postcard, the certainty that the ‘war criminal’ is guilty – and that the ICTY can ‘bring them 
to justice’ – positions the ICTY as an institution with the ability to enforce retributive justice upon 
                                                          
20 Schwöbel, (n 4). 
21 Sara Kendall, ‘Commodifying Global Justice: Economics of Accountability at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2015) Journal of International Criminal Justice 113, 133. 
22 Schwöbel, (n 4), 270. 
23 Engle, (n 10). 
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evil, and suggests that the ICTY should be supported for this ability. And yet there is something 
unsettling about this marketing from an institution that is, in fact, charged with upholding the rights 
of the accused and the presumption of innocence – not with assuming or reinforcing guilt. Indeed, 
the ICTY Statute states that all accused enjoy the presumption of innocence,24 and that proof of 
guilt must be established ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’.25 If a prosecutor cannot bring evidence that 
is sufficient to meet this high standard, an acquittal must follow.26 Further, the ICTY Statute vests 
the Trial Chambers with the responsibility to ensure that trials ‘are fair and expeditious’.27 The 
rights of the accused must be upheld, as ‘minimum guarantees’.28 These responsibilities are not 
invoked in the marketing of the ICTY through this postcard, but they are what the tribunal is 
charged with. Perhaps this is because the possibility of acquittals sits uneasily alongside this desire 
to end impunity, and acquittals are not good marketing tools – as Damaška reminds us, with his 
warning that acquittals are not seen as strengths of the Tribunal but rather as ‘failure’.29 The phrase 
‘bringing to trial people who are alleged to have committed war crimes’ may be a more accurate 
description of the ICTY’s mandate, but it is certainly less engaging than the bold claim that the 
ICTY ‘brings war criminals to justice’. 
In this way, the ICTY reinforces the guilt of the ‘war criminal’, in order to support its own 
operation. In order to end impunity, the Tribunal must function, and ‘bring war criminals to 
justice’. While this reinforcement of guilt complements the aim of ending impunity, it also fortifies 
the idea that acquittals are a failure (rather than the sometimes appropriate outcome of a proper 
trial process). The advancement of guilt as a method of marketing is troubling for an institution 
which must balance the aim of ending impunity with the necessity of according the accused a fair 
trial, the presumption of innocence, and procedural rights.   
                                                          
24 ICTY Statute art 21(3); Rome Statute art 66.  
25 ICTY Statute art 18; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Doc No IT/32/Rev.48 (adopted on 11 February 1994, amended 19 November 2012) (‘ICTY Rules’) r 87; Rome 
Statute art 66(3). 
26 However, there are some concerns that the judgments of international criminal trials rest on unsatisfactory 
epistemological grounds , see Nancy Combs, Fact Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations 
of International Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010)). In relation to the International Criminal 
Court, Simon De Smet has argued that there is a lack of certainty about what the standard ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
means.  See Simon De Smet, ‘The International Criminal Standard of Proof at the ICC — Beyond Reasonable 
Doubt or Beyond Reason?’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court: A 
Critical Account of Challenges and Achievements (Oxford University Press, 2015) 861. 
27 ICTY Statute art 20; Rome Statute art 64(2). 
28 ICTY Statute art 21(4); Rome Statute art 67. 
29 Damaška, ‘Reflections on Fairness in International Criminal Justice’, (n Error! Bookmark not defined.2), 613. 
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As Engle has argued, human rights advocates must be encouraged to ‘imagine a world in which 
the culture of impunity is not their principal opponent’.30 In a similar way, in order to achieve a 
truly transformative moment, advocates of international criminal law should be focused on ending 
atrocities and the conditions that give rise to them – rather than simply on ending impunity. 
Certainly, where ‘ending impunity’ connotes ‘conviction’, advocates of international criminal law 
must guard against any weakening of the trial process. As part of this vigilance, advocates of 
international criminal law should rally against marketing which reinforces guilt as a necessary 
outcome of a trial process. 
… AND JUSTICE TO VICTIMS 
If the goal to end impunity is the galvanizing force of international criminal law, a second core 
rationale for international criminal law has been the emphasis on providing redress to the victims 
of atrocity. The victims are positioned as the primary reasons for the existence and the performance 
of the system— they are ‘the one in whose name criminal justice is exercised’.31 This focus has 
been further strengthened in recent years, by the ability for victims at the ICC to participate 
formally in trial proceedings, through ‘Victims Representatives’ (the participating victims are 
usually not physically present themselves).32 Previously, at institutions including the ICTY, 
victims were only able to participate in the trial if they appeared as witnesses.33 Indeed, the 
centrality of the victims is also evident in the postcard, which articulates ‘bringing justice to 
victims’ as a primary aim and activity of the ICTY. Here, the victims are symbolised by the ragged 
cloth handcuffs used to bind the wrists of the victims at Srebrenica. And yet, as I set out here, there 
are significant problems with this symbol of victimhood: it emphasises some victims and not 
others, reinforces a ‘good versus evil’ narrative, and positions the Tribunal as a hero acting on 
behalf of agentless victims. 
It is worth pausing to reflect on the particular language used on the postcard to describe the cloth 
handcuffs. On the front of the postcard, the handcuffs are identified by a prosecution exhibit 
number and, in brackets, the word ‘Srebrenica’; and we know that the handcuffs were ‘found on a 
                                                          
30 Engle, (n 10), 1127. 
31 Sara Kendall and Sarah Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap 
between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’ (2013) 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 235, 254. 
32 Rome Statute art 68(3). See Kendall and Nouwen, (n 31), for a critique of the position and treatment of victims.  
33 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v the Rights of the Accused’ (2010) 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 137, 137–8. 
9 
 
body in a mass grave near Srebrenica’. The language is generic. We do not know the name of the 
person whose wrists were bound in these handcuffs. Perhaps this is appropriate in the particular 
circumstances, but nonetheless it is indicative of a reality where victims of atrocity often become 
‘disembodied, depersonified, and … depoliticised’.34 Such abstraction means that victims are ‘not 
concrete persons of flesh, blood and water, with individual names and individual opinions’.35 
Rather, they are positioned as ‘deity-like’, and become the sovereign entity of international 
criminal law.36 Yet in the process, they lose their own selves in the service of international criminal 
law. The handcuffs suggest a punishment, a certain violation: this is strikingly different in its 
particularity from the generic language ascribed to the victim himself. We do not know who the 
man is, but we have a real sense of the violence that was inflicted on him. He is reduced to a story 
about the method of his killing. We do not know anything about this victim, except that he died 
with his hands bound. 
I use the gendered pronoun ‘he’ in relation to this victim, because the description on the postcard 
that the body was found ‘in a mass grave near Srebrenica’ implies that he was one of the 7,000-
8,000 men and boys who were killed in the eastern part of Bosnia in 1995. And thus we can see 
that the postcard emphasises one particular type of victim: the man of Srebrenica. This object is 
inherently gendered, in a way perhaps not immediately apparent. In making this particular victim 
a representative of ‘The Victims’ at the ICTY,37 the ICTY has chosen to focus in its marketing on 
one particular aspect of atrocity and of victimhood. In emphasising this victim, other experiences 
of victimhood are ignored. The women of Srebrenica are not given a place in this object. The 
traumas of these women are not recognized in these handcuffs.38 This image only evokes a 
particular, male, experience of atrocity.  
Moreover, in this image of victimhood there is no place for victims and the various experiences of 
atrocity in areas other than Srebrenica. This symbol denies the victims of the Omarksa camp, or 
the massacre of Prijedor, or – even further afield – the victims of places like Vukovar, Pejë, or 
                                                          
34 Sarah Nouwen, ‘Justifying Justice’ in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion 
to International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 327, 340. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid; Kendall and Nouwen, (n 31), 254. 
37 See Kendall and Nouwen, (n 31). 
38 For example, the rapes committed against the women as part of the assault on the Eastern enclaves of Bosnia; see 
Prosecutor v Krstić (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No IT-98-33). 
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Belgrade. It ignores the victims of sexual violence, such as of the widespread rapes that occurred 
in the former Yugoslavia.39 And in this image of victimhood, we also see no acknowledgment of 
victims that were not Bosnian Muslim. What of the victims of other ethnicities: the Croats, Serbs, 
or Kosovars? This image compresses and simplifies the multitude of experiences of victimhood, 
leaving behind the complexity both of the victims and the crimes committed against them.40   
The postcard’s two sets of handcuffs also reinforce a perceived divide between victim and 
perpetrator. Here, victim and perpetrator are presented as two very separate entities. Indeed, in 
international criminal justice, this dichotomy between perpetrator and victim is often reinforced. 
However, the emphasis on the difference between victim and perpetrator is perhaps inaccurate. 
Not infrequently, the accused may have been a victim of crimes, and victims may be perpetrators; 
indeed, ‘the lines between victims and victimizers in atrocity often are porous’.41 Yet such 
complexity is not admitted in the postcard, and instead – as is so often the case - the difference 
between the perpetrator and the victim is reinforced. There is no disruption of the comfortable 
narrative of good versus evil. 
Reinforcing the difference between perpetrator and victim, the postcard emphasises the difference 
in the experience of justice for these two separate entities: justice is given to the victim but enforced 
upon the perpetrator. The statement that it is the ICTY ‘bringing war criminals to justice and justice 
to victims’ positions the Tribunal as the institution responsible for this movement of ‘justice’ – it 
is the ICTY that provides and enforces justice. In this statement, we see the Tribunal acting as 
savior for the agentless victims, against the evil of the war criminal.  
This triangulation of victim, perpetrator, and Tribunal operates to promote the role of the ICTY 
and of international criminal law. Here, all the characters have their roles and their relationships. 
However, the only one with any power is the Tribunal. Its activity is presented as something worthy 
of support, and in this way, is marketed to the public consumers of the postcards. Thus we see that 
                                                          
39 See Prosecutor v Kunarac (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No IT-96-23) and 
Prosecutor v Furundžija (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No IT-95-17/1). 
40 What other option is possible, though? It would be similarly challenging if there was a whole ‘gallery’ of 
postcards, each dedicated to a particular site of atrocity; each essentialising a particular victimhood. Such a gallery 
might also reveal the problem with selectivity of international criminal law – there would ultimately be many crime 
scenes not present in the postcards, because they are not present in the prosecutions.  
41 Mark Drumbl, ‘The Ongwen Trial at the ICC: Tough Questions on Child Soldiers’ (14 April 2015) Open 
Democracy <https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mark-drumbl/ongwen-trial-at-icc-tough-questions-
on-child-soldiers> accessed 28 February 2017. 
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– rather than promoting the voice of victims, which is the purported aim of the Tribunal – this 
postcard operates instead to bolster the position of the ICTY. It does this through a particular 
representation of victims (as needing the Tribunal to provide them justice), but this representation 
may not actually benefit the victims. Schwöbel has examined such portrayals of the ICC, and 
argues that a binary is created, ‘between the strong, interventionist, active’ international criminal 
lawyers, and the ‘weak, subjugated, passive’ individuals in whose name the lawyers purport to 
speak.42 In this object of the postcard, the Tribunal is presented as what Anne Orford would call 
‘the character able to act in the world, and to imagine, create and bring about new worlds in his 
image’.43 This presentation is achieved through the postcard’s representation of the accused as the 
guilty character and the victims as the character dependent on the Tribunal. Through this 
marketing, the international community is provided with a reason to support the work of the 
Tribunal: to support the helpless victim against the evil war criminal. 
A REIMAGINATION 
The idea of ‘bringing war criminals to justice and justice to victims’ is rhetorically powerful. It is 
also persuasive: of course, it is not desirable either to allow war criminals to enjoy impunity, or to 
permit victims to languish without redress for the harms they have suffered. And, of course, for 
too long this is exactly what occurred in post-conflict settings. The ICTY was established (in part) 
to address the situation where atrocities went unpunished and victims were left without amends. 
Clearly, ‘bringing war criminals to justice and justice to victims’ – replacing the handcuffs of 
atrocity with the handcuffs of law – is symbolic of all that international criminal law has set out to 
achieve, and thus cannot easily be rejected. Its use to promote and market international criminal 
law (and the ICTY) is also understandable. Ending impunity and giving a meaningful voice to 
victims are aims of international criminal law, but they are also narratives about why international 
criminal law must be supported and thus why the product or service of international criminal law 
should be promoted. As a marketing tool, this postcard does promote international criminal law as 
being able to achieve justice against criminals and for victims. 
Yet the simplicity of ‘bringing war criminals to justice and justice to victims’ belies a far more 
complex reality. Atrocities must not be reduced to narratives of ‘good versus evil’, and victims 
                                                          
42 Schwöbel, (n 1), 278. 
43 Anne Orford, ‘Reading Humanitarian Intervention’ (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 170. 
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should not be sorted into categories of those more and less worthy of redress. Conviction should 
not be promoted as a core activity of international criminal law: international criminal law must 
ensure that trials are fair and comply with established procedural standards. These stories, told by 
the postcard, are problematic. The postcard is indicative of the decontextualisation that 
international criminal law has been critiqued for; of the way it fails to engage with the structural 
causes of conflict and yet emphasises a simple answer of guilt to a very complicated and sad 
situation. It can only be hoped that one day, the marketing of international criminal law need not 
rest upon messages of necessarily guilty perpetrators, agentless victims, and ‘white Knight’, 
muscular Tribunals.44 Perhaps the only way to achieve this is to bolster the position of international 
criminal law, so that it need not market itself in order to gain support. Yet this, too, sits 
uncomfortably. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that we wish for a world where there is true 
structural justice, and there is no need for international criminal law at all.  
 
                                                          
44 On ‘white knights’ and muscularity in humanitarianism, see Orford, ibid, and Anne Orford, ‘Muscular 
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism’ (1999) European Journal of International 
Law 679. 
